Scandal and Reform in the Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly by Marland, Alex
Scandal and Reform in the
Newfoundland and Labrador
House of Assembly
by Alex Marland
In 2006 Newfoundland and Labrador was rocked by news of a spending scandal in
the provincial legislature. Dozens of Members of the House of Assembly
(MHAs)—sitting, retired, leaders, ministers, critics, backbenchers—from all three
political parties had spent money in a dubious manner for more than a decade. This
article looks at the details of the scandal and the subsequent reforms outlined by a
special commission. It concludes that while confidence in the Office of the Auditor
General and the current Premier increased, the public’s trust in politicians and
government was seriously eroded.
B
eginning in 1989, members of Newfoundland and
Labrador's legislature were allocated an annual
“constituency allowance” to offset costs associated
with performing their duties, such as office equipment,
newspaper subscriptions, and miscellaneous business
supplies. The available allowance varied, with St. John’s
representatives each drawing up to $14,400 annually,
whereas Members of the House of Assembly (MHAs) in
some geographically vast and distant ridings accessing
up to $84,800 per year (2006 figures). To access these
funds members were required to submit expenditure
claims and supporting documentation to the
legislature’s Director of Financial Operations. This
public servant was tasked with approving, correcting, or
rejecting each claim. If approved the expenditure
amount was reimbursed to the member.
Between the fiscal years 1989-90 and 2005-06 approxi-
mately 18,400 claims for nearly $25 million were pro-
cessed for 115 MHAs.1 This suggests that, on average,
every member had been reimbursed $216,960 for 160 ap-
proved claims. However some of them held office for less
than a year while others were responsible for large sums.
Moreover, there were serious accounting issues, much of
which centered on a handful of officials.
The arbitrary nature of the constituency allowance ex-
pense process was, in hindsight, a major problem. MHAs
and their legislative staff frequently sought guidance
from the legislature’s staff as to what goods and services
could be claimed as well as about the requirements for
supporting documentation (e.g., receipts). According to
the Auditor General, the Clerk of the House of Assembly
“concentrated on parliamentary matters and delegated
the weight of financial management to the Director of Fi-
nancial Operations”. House staff provided inconsistent
advice and even prepared some members’ claims. The
result was a mishmash of expenditures that were at times
unethical or fraudulent.
Inappropriate and Questionable Spending
Constituency allowances were established in 1989
upon the recommendation of an independent commis-
sion. Gradually, elected officials adjusted compensation
practices in their favour, and when challenged would
evoke the principle of legislative independence. By 1996,
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some of the original framework safeguards were being
replaced by block funding for MHAs.
In 2000, the Office of the Auditor General discovered
that claims for artwork and wine had been processed for
a sitting Cabinet Minister.2 This was brought to the atten-
tion of a bipartisan (Liberal and Progressive Conserva-
tive) committee known as the Commission of Internal
Economy (IEC)—of whom the Minister in question was
one of seven members. The IEC ruled that constituency
expenditures would be off limits to the Auditor General.
Furthermore it coordinated an amendment to the Internal
Economy Commission Act which eliminated the need for
adequate proof of payment when claims were submitted.
There was consequently no scrutiny in subsequent years
when financial data were tabled in the legislature incor-
rectly indicating that members were spending within
their approved limits.
In early 2006, with the approval of Premier Danny Wil-
liams, the Office of the Auditor General began examining
constituency allowance spending. During that summer,
the government auditor issued several preliminary re-
ports, followed by a final report in September 2007.
Spending was grouped into nine categories: advertising
and promotion, discretionary, donations, entertainment,
office expenses, per diems, travel, vehicle mileage, and
unallocated (lacking sufficient documentation). A wide
range of inappropriate and questionable spending was
identified.
a) Additional Allowances
In 2004 the Commission of Internal Economy autho-
rized a $2,875 top-up payment which all but two of the
legislature’s 48 members accepted. This type of addi-
tional remuneration had been awarded in past years and
the Clerk had been expressly urged by the IEC to keep the
minutes of its meetings vague. Such a discretionary pay-
ment would otherwise have been taxable income.
b) Alcohol
Approximately $120,000 in constituency allowance
funds had been spent by 57 MHAs on alcohol purchased
at retail stores. This does not include drinks consumed in
restaurants. The Auditor General noted that one MHA
had been personally reimbursed just over $34,000 for al-
cohol. This included purchases made outside the prov-
ince and receipts submitted with the details blacked out.
c) Capital Assets
Nearly $1 million of constituency allowance funds
were spent on business items with long term use, such as
computers and mobile phones. The IEC deemed that any
such capital assets belonged to the legislature for the first
three years at which point the MHA became the sole
owner regardless of any remaining market value. This
depreciation policy was particularly inappropriate for
artwork and furniture.
d) Donations
Almost all (108) MHAs since 1989 had used their con-
stituency allowance to make donations totalling nearly
$1.5 million. This tended to encompass a wide range of
localized purposes, including school activities, commu-
nity festivals, clothing, household goods, passport fees,
raffle tickets and even the transportation of human re-
mains. This spending implied that government funds
were given primarily to supporters or used to influence
constituents’ political preferences. As well, just over
$50,000 was given to registered charities, which raised
the possibility of deductions being made on personal
income tax forms.
e) Double Billing
The lack of internal controls contributed to 88 MHAs
claiming a total of nearly $200,000 twice. Constituency
allowance payments were sometimes approved for orig-
inal invoices, for copies of invoices, and again when
proof of payment was submitted. In some instances the
same expense appeared more than once on the same
claim form. A further $17,000 had been claimed through
departmental accounts by Ministers, Parliamentary Sec-
retaries and Parliamentary Assistants and then again
through their constituency allowances.
f) Excess Allowance Claims
The Auditor General’s most serious allegation was
that five MHAs had been remunerated for excess constit-
uency allowance claims totalling nearly $1.6 million. He
also questioned the legitimacy of some payments total-
ling just over $2.8 million to four companies. Roughly
half a million items such as lapel pins, refrigerator mag-
nets and key chains had supposedly been purchased
since 1999, as well as $69,000 spent on 79 customized
MHA gold rings displaying the provincial coat of arms.3.
g) Excess Discretionary Allowance
Until 2004-05, members were allotted a supplemen-
tary “discretionary allowance” that was non-taxable and
for which no receipts were required. This allowance was
for miscellaneous expenses. However, thirty-three
MHAs collectively received just over $200,000 beyond
their discretionary limit, with four of them being respon-
sible for roughly $177,000 of such excess claims.
h) Insufficient Documentation
The Auditor General identified $5.4 million in constit-
uency allowance payments that involved unsatisfactory
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documentation, such as a photocopied cheque, an un-
dated claim form, or a credit card transaction. There were
many vague details, such as the instance of a
non-descript convenience store bill for $798, or airfare re-
ceipts with no itinerary information. The same five
MHAs who were cited for excess constituency allowance
claims allegedly received $534,000 backed by no
documentation at all.
i) Office Rental and Equipment
There were three instances totalling nearly $50,000
where MHAs had drawn on their constituency allow-
ance for rents and/or expenses (e.g., renovations) associ-
ated with a property that they owned or had a financial
stake in. Furthermore, invoices were the only documen-
tation available regarding the legislature’s leasing of of-
fice equipment such as photocopiers (16 of which could
not be located), fax machines and shredders. There was
no tendering process for this and all purchases were
made through the same supplier at a cost higher than
market value.
j) Partisan Spending
A comparatively small figure of $11,000 was deemed
to have been spent on party-oriented activities, such as
political meetings, fundraising events and post-election
advertising.
k) Personal Items
Fifty-seven MHAs spent nearly $162,000 of constitu-
ency allowance monies on merchandise and services that
was likely for personal benefit and which private citizens
purchase with after-tax money. A wide variety of items
were claimed, including building supplies, family air-
fare, bicycle tune-ups, cookware, flowers, perfumes,
sunglasses, lottery tickets, cigarettes and underwear.
One member alone was reimbursed nearly $63,000 for
goods such as artwork and a $319 Cartier pen.
l) Travel
There were generally poor reimbursement procedures
for vehicle mileage. Claims were processed even when
basic details such as dates of travel or destination were
omitted. A gradually increasing distance between St.
John’s and an electoral district was found as were calcu-
lations which suggested that one member’s drive origi-
nated in the ocean. Four MHAs were compensated
nearly $58,000 for using their personal vehicles while
concurrently charging for a leased vehicle. Two other
MHAs claimed nearly $7,000 for travel that never took
place, for vehicle mileage when in fact the member had
flown, and for St. John’s restaurant claims that conflicted
with travel claims which stated that the member had
been elsewhere.
m) Sales Tax
The calculation of an MHA’s remaining constituency
allowance often did not include the Harmonized Sales
Tax (HST). As a result it was common for the available
limit to exceed the intended limit.
Hey taxpayers!
(Song on St. John’s radio station 94.7 CHOZ-FM, October 2007)
Hey taxpayers! Might have known.
Tell me where you get the money from.
Constituency allowance.
Constituency allowance.
Constituency allowance.
If a guy walks in with new socks and
shoes – constituency allowance!
And if a guy walks in with a case of
booze – constituency allowance!
If a guy got magnets on his fridge –
constituency allowance!
And if he hops on a plane with the wife
and kids – constituency allowance!
The Green Report and the Accountability Act
In between the Auditor General’s reports Premier Wil-
liams created an arms-length commission to review the
legislature’s policies regarding members’ compensation
levels and spending controls. In July 2006, Chief Justice
Derek Green of the province’s Supreme Court began
work on a report that would be released the following
May. The Green commission concluded that there had
been a “broad-based systemic failure” in the House of
Assembly’s administration and that the public interest
had not been at the forefront.4 Fully 80 recommendations
(which alone accounted for 52 of the weighty report’s 674
pages) were made, including advice to enact a draft bill.
Some of these are summarized here.
a) Clearer Standards and More Accessible Information
• Circulate organizational charts, policy information,
job descriptions and lists of the types of expenditures
that qualify as a constituency allowance expense.
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Items not qualifying for reimbursement should
include artwork, donations, gifts, raffle tickets and
other people’s travel costs.
• Clarify the duties of the Clerk of the House in
legislation, including responsibility as the chief
administrative and being the financial officer
reporting to the Speaker.
• Establish a code of conduct for elected officials,
publish standards of behaviour for legislature staff,
and prepare a manual for MHAs.
• Post financial information concerning the legislature
online, including constituency allowance
expenditures. MHAs’ financial information should be
subject to access to information requests.
• Prepare a strategic plan for the legislature that
identifies goals and risks.
• Replace the IEC with a restructured House of
Assembly Management Commission whose meetings
are open to the public and whose discussions are
recorded in Hansard. Membership should include a
third party (currently the New Democratic Party).
• The Clerk of the House should be the legislature’s
accounting officer and provide periodic financial
statements to MHAs.
b) Stricter Controls, Monitoring, and Enforcement
• Create an Audit Committee whose duties should
include reviewing internal controls.
• Establish a Commissioner for Legislative Standards
and introduce a whistleblower disclosure program.
• Have the Financial Administration Act apply to the
legislature, which should be subject to regular audit
processes. Make it an offence to fail to document or
retain records of administrative decisions.
• Improve computer security procedures and provide
staff training.
• Property such as furniture should be physically
marked as belonging to the legislature. The Clerk
should maintain an updated inventory report.
• Provide money to MHAs to set up constituency offices,
including at their personal home, as long as they do not
benefit from rent monies.
• Review the legislature’s purchasing practices. The
legislature should be generally guided by the Public
Tender Act, including compensating MHAs for
expenses only when a limit in a separate account has
not yet been reached.
c) Increased Difficulty to Adjust MHAs’ Compensa-
tion
• Allowances should be used for constituency business
rather than for personal or family benefit.
• Compensation for MHAs and legislature staff should
be set out in legislation which will require a minimum
of three session days to change. Management
Commission motions to change members’ allowances
must be published online and not voted upon until the
next meeting. Salaries for MHAs should not be
changed until after a general election.
• Eliminate MHAs’ non-taxable allowance by
integrating this into their taxable base salary and
establish a new pension plan structure for future
members.
• Ensure that members are ultimately accountable for
any allowance claims or associated overspending.
• MHAs’ pay should be docked $200 for each sitting day
they miss at the legislature, unless there is an
acceptable reason.
The Green report also recommended that restrictions
should be placed on the manner in which the Auditor
General communicates any questionable spending data.
Rather than holding regular news conferences to reveal
and explain the latest improprieties, as was common in
mid-2006, the Office of the Auditor General must hence-
forth provide information exclusively in its annual re-
ports, as part of committee proceedings, or upon request
of the House of Assembly Management Commission.
Accordingly, when he released his final report in Sep-
tember 2007, Auditor General John Noseworthy de-
ferred all media requests to elected officials.
Unfortunately the many representatives of all three par-
ties tended to avoid or refuse comment.
Moving Forward
Efforts are underway to improve accountability and
transparency in the Newfoundland and Labrador legis-
lature. The House of Assembly Accountability, Integrity and
Administration Act5 was passed in June 2007 within
weeks of Justice Green submitting his draft legislation.
The House of Assembly Management Commission has
been struck. In October, a Members’ Handbook6 and a
Member’s Allowances Rules Manual7 were circulated to
MHAs and their staff, and were made publicly available
online. Further action is likely such as whistleblower leg-
islation.
Disciplinary and punitive action is ongoing. Four
now-former MHAs (two Liberal, one NDP and one PC)
and the legislature’s now-former Director of Financial
Operations have been charged by the Royal Newfound-
land Constabulary with offences such as fraud over
$5,000, uttering a forged document and/or breach of
trust. These individuals and other members, most nota-
bly the former Finance Minister, have been sullied in the
mass media. Some sitting and former MHAs have al-
ready repaid questionable payments and others have
made arrangements to do so. A handful of former mem-
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bers face government efforts to recoup monies owing
while many more are unlikely to return legal but
unpalatable payments.
This episode reminds us that, without sufficient scru-
tiny, government officials can engage in behaviour that
they deem appropriate but which is clearly out of line
with public preferences. The local political culture, a lack
of fiscally-minded interest groups and Premier Wil-
liams’ decisive action may help explain why the public
furor was relatively contained. In fact, turnout in the sub-
sequent election dipped rather than plunged, and the
PCs were returned with an even stronger majority. Nev-
ertheless, the constituency allowance scandal is clear evi-
dence that there is reason to be concerned when an
Auditor General is prevented from reviewing
government finances, particularly amid all-party silence.
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